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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
mandamus would not have left relators without remedy, and that conse-
quently, although the court may have reached a desirable result, an un-
necessary ambiquity has been injected into the scope of the remedy avail-
able by mandamus.
Justice Adair is undoubtedly right about the blurring of distinctions
between the extraordinary writs, but this may not be all evil. While it
makes the law uncertain, it may also hasten the day when special relief
will be available if the facts warrant it, whatever the label used. This is a
stage long since reached in ordinary pleading, where misnomer of a cause
of action will not preclude relief. Rejection of extraordinary relief be-
cause the wrong writ was sought is all the more unfortunate wheii it re-
sults from simple failure to use the device of applying for a writ in the
alternative, since upon application for "a writ of mandamus or other ap-
propriate relief" the court can and will lend its aid by whatever form of
writ is technically proper.'
JOHN N. RADONICH
USEFUL LIFE AND SALVAGE VALUE ARE DEFINED BY THE SUPREME COURT
FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEPRECIATION PURPosEs.-In three companion
cases the United States Supreme Court has passed upon significant ques-
tions concerning depreciation of property used in trade or business or for
the production of income. All three cases involve automobiles or trucks
which were ordinarily used for short periods, then resold substantially be-
fore the end of their full economic or physical lives. The figures used in
describing the cases are hypothetical but typical.
In two of the cases the taxpayer took as basis for depreciation the cost
of the vehicles to him ($1,650) less their value as scrap ($50) at the end
of their economic life (4 years). As a result, at the time he sold them
(after 2 years) they were depreciated (to $800) far below their actual re-
sale price ($1,400) and the gain which he realized on the sale ($600) was
arguable that the scope of the constitutional writ of injunction should be deter-
mined with reference to those available at common law at the time the Montana
constitution was adopted. Cf., Scharnikow v. Hogan, 24 Mont. 379, 62 Pac. 493(1900). For discussion of cases involving mandatory injunctions see Klein, Ma/n-
datory Injunctions, 12 HAav. L. Rv. 95 (1898).
The Montana Supreme Court, in Grosfield v. Johnson, 98 Mont. 412, 423, 39
P.2d 660, 664 (1935) stated: "With rare exception, the mandatory form will not
be decreed for other purpose than to restore and maintain a condition which has
been wrongfully cjianged, but the early restrictions on this form of injunction have
given way to a more liberal construction of the court's power and the courts may
relax the rules in order to attain the ends of justice."
"See State eT rel. Stewart v. District Court, 103 Mont. 487, 63 P.2d 141 (1936) ; State
ex rel. Peel v. District Court, 50 Mont. 505, 197 Pac. 741 (1921). A qualification
to this statement must be made, however, in circumstances like those in State ez
rel. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. District Court, 77 Mont. 214, 250 Pac.
609 (1926), where upon an application for a writ of supervisory control or other
appropriate remedy the court denied relief because while certiorari would have been
appropriate the record from the court below had not been certified to the supreme
court.
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RECENT DECISIONS
treated as a long-term capital gain instead of as ordinary income.' The
Commissioner contended that the basis for depreciation should be the cost
of the vehicles less the estimated resale price and that the depreciation
period should be the period reasonably expected to elapse between acquisi-
tion and resale. In this way, if the time of, resale and the price to be ob-
tained were accurately estimated there would be no gain; the taxpayer
would therefore be prevented from turning ordinary income into capital
gain by way of deductions for depreciation. In one case the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held for the taxpayer, and in the other the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held for the Commissioner.' On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, the former judgment
reversed and the latter affirmed. Depreciation of property used in trade
or business is to be based upon the period during which the taxpayer may
reasonably be expected to use it, and salvage value is the estimated amount
of the resale price. Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1411
(1960) (Justices Harlan, Whittaker, Stewart, and Douglas dissenting).'
In the third case the taxpayer used the declining balance method of
computing depreciation with respect to automobiles which had an economic
life of four years but which he customarily retained in his business only
two years. The declining balance method is available only if the property
to be depreciated has a useful life of three years or more.' As to trucks,
which the taxpayer used for more than three years, he was entitled to
utilize the declining balance method, but in doing so he depreciated the
trucks below their reasonable salvage value. Subsequent to the years in-
volved, treasury regulations were promulgated defining useful life as the
period over which the assets would be useful to the taxpayer and forbidding
depreciation below salvage value.' The taxpayer urged that the regulations
were inconsistent with the statute and that in any event they should not
be retroactively applied to him. The district court held for the taxpayer,'
but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.' On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. Useful life means the
period during which the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful to
the taxpayer in his trade or business; the declining balance method may
not be used to depreciate property below its salvage or resale value; regu-
lations to the foregoing effect are valid and may be applied retroactively to
this taxpayer. Hertz Corp. v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1420 (1960) (Jus-
tice Douglas dissenting8 ).
These three cases required the Supreme Court to pass upon the defini-
tion of "useful life" as applied to depreciable assets used in trade or busi-
ness. The determination of the period of useful life was important for
two reasons. Whether straight-line, declining balance or some other method
'Ordinary income is. taxed at rates up to 91%, while a long-term capital gain is
taxed at rates not exceeding 25%. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1, 1201.2Evans v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 264 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1959).
'United States v. Massey Motors, Inc., 264 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1959).
'80 Sup. Ct. 1424 (1960).
8INT. RE V. CODE OF 1954, § 167(c).
6Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b) (1956).7Hertz Corp. v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1958).
'268 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1959).
980 Sup. CL 1424, at 1431 (1960).
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is used for computing depreciation, the number of years of "useful life"
is an important factor in computing the depreciation to be taken in each
year.' Moreover, the declining balance option is available only if the
asset has a useful life of at least three years.'
The phrase "useful life" was first used in the statute in 1954 in
specifying when the declining balance method is available, but even then
it was not defined.' The statutes since 1913 have referred to depreciation
as being permitted for the "wear and tear of property arising out of its
use or employment in the business"' or "wear and tear of property used in
the trade or business."" The Commissioner's regulations have, however,
since 1919 referred to the "useful life" of the property as determinative
of the depreciation rate,' although the language of the regulations does not
expressly limit "useful life" to the period during which such assets are
held by the taxpayer. While the regulations and statutes do not use the
term "useful life" with precision, the Supreme Court thought it reason-
ably clear that the language of the statutes and the regulations tended to
support the view that useful life was the period over which the asset would
be used by the taxpayer, and not the period of the asset's longer physical
life.
It is, perhaps, difficult to approach the question by inquiring into the
intent of Congress because the statutes are somewhat ambiguous. The tax-
payer in the Massey case contended that, regardless of the taxpayer's policy
on replacements, useful life is the period of the asset's entire economic or
physical life. For the most part, assets are retained for their entire eco-
nomic life, but this is not true in the auto rental business. Taxpayer argues
'5The traditional method of calculating the annual depreciation, whether for tax
purposes or for accounting purposes, is the "straight-line" method. The annual de-
preciation can be expressed by the formula: Original cost-Salvage Value (if any)Estimated Years of Useful Life
Declining balance depreciation is computed by using a rate of depreciation not
exceeding twice the straight-line rate (computed without adjustment for salvage).
This rate is applied uniformly to the undepreciated cost of the property.
For example, assume a machine costs $1,000 and is expected to last the tax-
payer 5 years after which time it can probably be resold for $50. The straightline
method, using the formula above would give depreciation of $190 (i.e., $1,000- $
each year for five years.
To compute depreciation using the declining balance method, first compute the
straight-line rate. Since the machine will be used for 5 years, 1/5 or 20% is the
annual rate. The taxpayer using the declining balance method can take up to twice
this rate, or 40%, Of the unrecovered cost each year, ignoring salvage value. The
following table illustrates the depreciation to be taken for each of the 5 years:
Unrecovered Depreciation
Cost at rate applied to Amount of
Year beginning of year undepreciated cost depreciation
1 $1,000.00 40% $400.00
2 600.00 40% 240.00
3 360.00 40% 144.00
4 216.00 40% 86.40
5 129.60 40% 51.84
6 77.76 No depreciation is taken after the fifth year.
For further illustrations, see Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-2(b).
'INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 167(c).
"Ibid.
"Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 167.
*"Revenue Act of 1918, § 214(a) (8), 40 Stat. 1067.
"Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 161 (1919), and Treas. Reg. 103, § 19-23(1)-1 (1940).
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that Congress set up a rule for the ordinary case and intended depreciation
be based on the period during which the asset is economically valuable to
the general business world. The main advantage to the taxpayer is that
salvage is then the scrap value of the property at the end of its economic
life, a problem to be taken up shortly. For the taxpayer in the Hertz case,
however, useful life was important for still another reason: only if useful
life were physical life and thus more than the three years required for the
declining balance method could the taxpayer take advantage of that method
of calculating depreciation.
Over the years, the Commissioner has taken the position in many Tax
Court cases that useful life was physical life.' While his position cannot
be said to be uniform in all cases, he certainly has not in the past adhered
to his present position of holding-period life. In most of those cases, how-
ever, he was fighting premature depreciation and was not faced with the
problem of other tax avoidance on the part of the taxpayer.' In view of
the purpose of depreciation (i.e., to allow the taxpayer to recover, tax-free,
the cost of his depreciable assets), the Commissioner's present position seems
to be the preferable one. Only if useful life is based upon the period during
which the taxpayer reasonably expects to use the asset, will depreciation
bear a logical relation to the cost of the taxpayer's using depreciable assets
in his business or in the production of income. The Supreme Court
unanimously agreed that, in principle, this present position is preferable
to the contrary rule applied by some lower federal courts. The split in the
Court was on another question.
Once useful life is defined, salvage value obviously refers to the amount
expected to be recovered from the disposition of the asset at the end of its
useful life. If, as in the instant cases, the taxpayer expects to dispose of
his assets substantially before they are physically exhausted, then salvage
value is the expected resale price at the time of disposal. Clearly the tax-
payers in the instant cases would benefit most from the view that salvage
value always means scrap value, for in such case, accumulated depreciation
can include almost the entire cost of the asset. Then, on resale, the differ-
ence between the resale price and the undepreciated cost will be taxed at
the favorable long-term capital gains rates rather than at ordinary income
rates. In the Hertz case, however, there was a separate question whether
Congress intended to make salvage value a limit on depreciation taken under
the declining balance method. The taxpayer contended that Congress had
'
6Cited by the Court, 80 Sup. Ct. at 1417 n. 5, and some of them discussed in the
dissenting opinion, 80 Sup. Ct. at 1428-29.
"'By "other tax avoidance" is meant savings by way of long-term capital gains. It is
doubtful that the Commissioner, in the Tax Court cases referred to in note 16,
supra, would have taken a position that useful life was physical life if he were
presented with issues similar to those in the instant cases, i.e., if he knew the neces-
sary result of his position would be to allow other taxpayers to set themselves up
for tax savings by way of long-term capital gains, his position might have been very
much different. That he did not realize the consequences is understandable since
the car rental business is new and the insistence of customers on new cars only is
even more recent. Thus, it has been only in recent years that car rental companies
have been in the position of buying new cars at dealer prices and reselling them
after short periods on the wholesale or retail market at prices .near acquisition
cost. Few businesses fall into this category, and therefore the Commissioner has not
been faced with the situation often.
1960]
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provided for a "built-in salvage value" for assets depreciated by the de-
clining balance method, since under that method, salvage value is-ignored
in setting up the depreciation equation, and by applying a constant de-
preciation rate to the declining basis there will always be a mathematical
residue of undepreciated cost." This residue, contended Hertz, was intend-
ed by Congress to replace any other salvage value. A mathematical residue
will not, however, have any logical relation to salvage value, regardless of
the meaning given to the term, and according to the House Committee re-
port, the declining balance method was intended to affect only "the tim-
ing and not the ultimate amount of depreciation. '" Only if salvage value
is the estimated recovery upon disposition will the ultimate amount of de-
preciation remain the same as under other methods of depreciation. On
this point, the Supreme Court was in unanimous agreement that salvage
value under any method of depreciation should, on principle, be no less
than the expected recovery on disposition of the asset.
These rules on useful life and salvage value will have considerable tax
consequences to car rental companies and to others enjoying a similar situa-
tion regarding acquisitions and disposals of fixed assets. Car rental com-
panies buy new cars at dealer prices and resell them at wholesale or retail
prices. If, as would often be the case, estimated resale price is only slightly
less than original cost,' the taxpayer would be allowed a deduction for de-
preciation limited to the difference between original cost and estimated re-
sale price. Then, on resale, if the resale price had been estimated ac-
curately, there would be no gain or loss on disposition.' This situation,
argued the taxpayers in the instant cases, rendered section 1231 of the
1954 Code' ineffective, for this section expressly provides for the recog-
nition of long-term capital gains from the sales of depreciable property.
It does not follow, however, that the Commissioner's present position and
the rules announced in the instant cases will necessarily have the result of
abolishing capital gains and the long-term capital gains advantage. Even
under the Commissioner's present position, if an asset is sold before orig-
inally intended or for more money than originally estimated, a gain on
resale would enjoy the favorable long-term capital gains treatment provided
for in section 1231, if it otherwise qualifies.' The present rules merely
require an originally honest and fair estimate of what useful life and sal-
vage will be, based on the use the taxpayer himself expects to make of the
asset. Any change of plans or change in the used asset values would not
require the taxpa.yer to recompute depreciation for prior years, but would
make available to him the provisions of section 1231.
18See note 10 8upra.
"H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2nd Sess. 25 (1954).
20In the Masey case used automobiles were actually sold after 40,000 miles for more
than their cost to the taxpayer new.
'Of course, fluctuating resale prices can never be estimated two or three years in ad-
vance with any degree of accuracy, but gains and losses will, at least, be minimized
by the application of the rules of the instant cases regarding useful life and salvage
value.
"Section 1231 of the 1954 Code is substantially the same as § 117(J) (2) of the INT.
Rzv. CODs or 1939 under which the Mas8ey case was decided.
'For a capital gain to be a long-term capital gain, the asset must have been held for
more than 6 months. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1222.
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The Supreme Court's split of opinion occurred regarding retroactive
application of the rules to these taxpayers. In the Massey case, four jus-
tices dissented on the ground that the Commissioner has now taken a posi-
tion contrary to his former position and that taxpayers were entitled to
rely on the former position until changed. In the Hertz case, however, only
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented. The other three justices agreed that the
Hertz case, arising under the declining balance provision of the 1954 Code,
presented a different problem from that in the Massey case. In the 1954
Code, Congress used the term "useful life" for the first time when pro-
vision was made for declining balance depreciation, and expressly gave the
Commissioner authority to issue regulations prescribing the use of declining
balance depreciation. Although regulations promulgated in 1956 might
appear to be retroactive as to taxable years 1954, 1955, and 1956, these
regulations were in fact the first ones issued under this provision of the
1954 Code, and any prior position regarding declining balance was ex-
pressed only in administrative practice and not by regulation. For this
reason, the three justices agreed that the Commissioner should be al-
lowed, by formal regulation, to change his position retroactive to the ef-
fective date of the statute under which it is promulgated. Justice Douglas
urged that the regulation produced a change in administrative practice
which should not be retroactively applied under the circumstances of the
Hertz case.
Irrespective of the question of fairness in the retroactive application
of the new rules to particular taxpayers, and of the question of the Com-
missioner's consistency through the years, these cases settle the law in the
Commissioner's favor by holding that his regulations fairly carry out the
intent and purpose of the provisions for depreciation. The present situa-
tion appears to be more in accord with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples, although, as the court noted, accounting authorities are not in com-
plete harmony. The present position is proper, at least from the basis of
fairness, since a taxpayer should not be allowed to distort the provisions
of the tax laws to his own peculiar advantage, where it is reasonably
clear that Congress intended to prohibit such advantage.
JAMES W. THOMPSON
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